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Abstract
The digital business ecosystem (DBE) is an infrastructure that is being designed to support the flexible
development and composition of business services. Operating under open source licensing and
designed according to open standards principles, the DBE is currently funded by the European
Commission. The issue facing DBE project partners who include research institutions, large
technology companies and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is how to sustain the
momentum of the project once funding ceases. Responsibility for maintaining the infrastructure and
ensuring that it remains open will fall to a governing body. However, the legal and organisational
requirements of that body have yet to be defined. This paper provides details of research in progress
which is being carried out into questions of governance and sustainability of the DBE infrastructure.
Data collection will take the form of a ground-up process of consultation in which participating SMEs
will be asked for their views on what form of governance the nascent DBE community should adopt.
Early feedback suggests three areas of governance will take precedence during this transition phase:
the constitution of a governing body; governance necessary to maintain the DBE infrastructure; and
governance to support SME participation.

1

1

INTRODUCTION

The Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE) is a project funded by the European Commission whose
objective is to produce a pan-European infrastructure for the flexible composition and development of
business services. The infrastructure is being built to support growth and collaboration among small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and is being developed under open source legislation and
according to open standards principles. Currently comprised of over around 40 individual but interrelated software projects, one of the main concerns of the DBE is how to maintain the interest of
contributors once the project ceases to be funded in October 2006. For some, taking part in the DBE
is a purely commercial venture and their interest will only be maintained if there is a clear business
case for staying involved. For others, there is potential to see the open source idea of software as a
‘public good’ extended to large-scale technological infrastructure so that it too can be developed and
exist as a public good. Maintaining the commitment of community members after the initial launch of
a project is a common concern among open source communities and sustaining the interest of a
developer community long enough to establish a large scale infrastructure is a central concern of the
DBE project.
One of the key factors upon which community sustainability hinges is governance (Weber, 2004).
Reliable systems of governance have the potential to safeguard the interests of contributors and could
assist the DBE in its transition from funded project to open community. Early empirical research into
this question has identified 3 building blocks of governance that require further investigation. These
include: the formation of a DBE governing body; governance relating to the maintenance of the DBE
infrastructure; and governance pertaining to SME developer participation. The primary objectives of a
DBE governing body will be to instate the necessary constitutional apparatus to support technological
developments and formulate a basic framework for community decision making. These apparati will
have implications for the software development methodologies that are used as well as for the way
power and influence will be distributed among developers and other interested parties.
This paper describes research in progress that is being carried out into issues of governance and the
DBE.
Following a description of the DBE project and technology, a discussion of potential
governance framework requirements based on the open source literature is provided. This part of the
paper also draws upon empirical research findings derived from a set of preliminary interviews carried
out with 14 SMEs who are taking part in DBE testing (Darking, 2005). Research into questions of
governance will require a further stage of data collection which has not yet taken place. The
theoretical foundation and design for this additional stage of data collection are described before some
initial implications regarding DBE governance are discussed.
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BUILDING PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE

2.1

The DBE Project and technology

The DBE is the name of both a European project and a technology (Nachira, 2002; Dini et al, 2005).
As a project, the DBE is funded under the European Commission’s 6th Framework Programme for
Research and Technological Development. There are 22 different partner organisations involved
including IBM, SUN, Intel, a number of SME organisations and various Universities and research
centres across Europe. Early stages of implementation and SME engagement have focused on 3 ‘DBE
regions’: the Tampere region of Finland, the region of Aragon in Spain and the West Midlands in the
UK. The DBE currently exists as a distributed development made up of around 40 individual software
projects which are gradually being integrated with one another. Each stage of integration is being
tested by a group of small software companies from the DBE regions who have elected to be early
participants in the project. Comprised of both small and large technology companies and drawing on
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research from a range of research disciplines the DBE faces some serious challenges when it comes to
balancing political and epistemological interests represented in the project.
As a technology, the DBE aims to provide a flexible, distributed infrastructure to underpin regional
economic growth, supporting local trade and industry through the composition and development of
software. The intention is that local ecosystems will gradually federate creating inter-regional
cooperation by fostering nodes of innovation and integrating pan-European, national and local
initiatives (Nachira, 2002). The project has drawn inspiration from physical and biological concepts
of self–organisation and evolution to produce a technological platform that will facilitate the flexible
composition of software services in a similar way to Microsoft’s .Net or SAP’s forthcoming business
process ‘appli-structure’. One of the key differences between the DBE and these infrastructures is the
fact that the DBE has been designed as a non–proprietary ‘public’ technology infrastructure.
The DBE can be regarded as a distributed middleware comprised of a ‘studio’ of tools, a run-time
environment and an ‘optimisation’ environment (see Table 1). The DBE Studio provides a range of
tools that allow the SME user to search for and develop new software services according to their
business needs. The run-time environment consists of a collection of server-clients. Since the DBE
controls both ‘end-points’, it can rely on a variety of different transport protocols. For example,
although SOAP has been used in the first instance, there is nothing to stop a more efficient binary
protocol from being introduced by enterprising community developers at a later date. The
evolutionary environment optimises the results that are achieved when searching for a service by
drawing on the local context or ‘habitat’ of the individual or organisation making the request.
As the table below shows, depending on the point of view, the DBE can be understood as three
dynamic and distributed environments or as three sets of local components that allow the individual
user to create/describe services, expose or consume services, and issue service search requests.

Development
Run-time
Optimisation

Local component
DBE Studio
SERVENT = SERV[er] + [cli]ENT
Habitat

Distributed Environment
Service Factory (SF)
Execution Environment (ExE)
Evolutionary Environment (EvE)

Table 1. Relationship between local components and distributed environments in the DBE
This whole area of the infrastructure is open source and the overall architecture is designed according
to the principles of open standards, thereby maximising the capacity that exists for being able to
couple and uncouple component parts. The high degree of abstraction in the overall architecture with
its emphasis on ‘meta–level’ design has been a strong selling point with SMEs for whom the
infrastructure is being principally designed. In early interviews, small software houses described how
difficult they find it to produce services at a cost point their customers are able to consider due to the
uncompetitive conditions in the software industry created by closed standards. In this respect, the
DBE aims to generate an advantage for smaller companies by encouraging cross–regional
collaboration, supporting the development of niche markets and reducing the number of development
silos that exist across Europe.
2.2

Creating a framework of governance: safeguarding incentives

One of the responsibilities of any organising body seeking to create a framework for governance is to
put in place the mechanisms necessary to support the interests of the community (Weber, 2004). In
the case of the DBE, creating a framework for governance refers to the need to establish an organising
body which is trusted by all members of community. In order to exist as an open community of
developers, this organising body will need to put in place necessary legal institutions such as the
General Public License known to support the development of non-proprietary software. In addition,
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there are specific citation and signalling (or voting systems) required that are necessary to safeguard
contribution incentives.
What constitutes a contribution incentive is an important question and the issue of why people choose
to contribute to open source developments is widely debated in the open source literature (Raymond,
1999). The question has a tendency to be narrowly conceived, with open source developers described
as either hobbyists, altruists or as motivated by ideologies which focus on ‘the public good’(Lakhani
& von Hippel, 2003). At the heart of these questions is an attempt to rationalise why someone would
contribute their unpaid time and effort to a software development project. The question of motivation
is often framed in terms of what incentives, other than financial ones, exist for contributing to an open
source project. Some have argued that instead of financial reward, there is a reputation incentive that
inspires individual contributors (Feller & Fitzgerald, 2002) whilst others attribute this to the notion of
gifts (Bergquist & Ljungberg, 2001).
The idea of reputation incentive is a useful one for understanding the organisational and governance
requirements of a new open source community such as the DBE. However, early empirical research
carried out for the DBE project shows that there are many more incentives for individual firms to
commit time and resources to open source developments. Findings from this data suggest that it is not
only personal incentive that plays a part in the desire to contribute to open sources projects. For some
the issue is a practical one where software ‘bugs’ are easier to resolve when there are lots of people
working on the same problem. For others open source communities provide an opportunity to learn
and remain up to date with the latest developments within a particular field. As well as a pronounced
incentive to learn about new developments some very clear business incentives are also involved.
Business ideas and learning carry over from open source projects into the work of small software
houses, enabling them to discover new niche markets and develop innovative solutions for their clients
which make use of the latest technologies. Not having to wait for commercial companies to release
new versions of software is another incentive which allows SME developers to work with bugs and
address client concerns according to their own timescales.
As well as licensing, two other important factors need to be accounted for in the governance of an
open source community; these are citation and signalling. Reliable citation and signalling mechanisms
are fundamental to establishing a foundation of trust within a developer community. If contributions
are not clearly authored then the whole basis for ‘voting through’ software alterations is open to
question. Similarly, if voting systems appear inefficient or non–representative then there are also
grounds for contributors to lose faith in basic community processes. The problem arises for new open
source communities where these mechanisms have not yet been established and where a particular
project or concept has yet to become viable as a commercial product.
Valid signalling mechanisms and market success infers that reputation incentives can
only be gained from open source projects that are up and running but this begs the
question, how does and open source project get up and running in the first place. Possible
explanation could be down to ideological superstructures (Franck & Jungworth, 2002:15)
By ideological superstructures, these authors refer to other kinds of incentives that developers might
find in being part of a particular project. For example, the concept of establishing technical
infrastructures as non–proprietary public goods is a powerful one which has the potential to interest
and motivate. However, in order to mobilise contributors motivated by these ends, clear indicators
need to be established that the project is not going to ‘go proprietary’.
In early interviews, discussions with SMEs concerning the question of membership and having
contributors from big technology companies involved in the community was generally not seen as a
problem. One reason for this is that contributions to open source software projects usually give
citation details that refer to the individual and exclude details of the company for which that individual
works. The boundary crossing nature of open source contributions where traditional models of ‘the
firm’ are replaced by notions of ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’ have been shown to cut across
hierarchy (Grand et al, 2002). In this respect, individual contributors from large technology

4

companies were judged on their ability ‘to be a good citizen’ in the same way as anyone else (SME
Interview 03.05.05). For the purposes of analysis it is important to bear in mind that although
individual contributors might be able to align their interests with those of an open source project, this
is different to saying that an entire company – or for example, it’s Board or Managing Director - might
also be capable of such alignment.
The case of the DBE raises important questions about how to study community in order to take into
account these differences in perspective. However, methodologically, a further challenge is presented
by the particular requirements that the study of infrastructural technologies makes. These
requirements are discussed in the following section.

3

RESEARCH METHOD

3.1

Studying infrastructure: theoretical perspectives

The concept of infrastructure is addressed by both IS and STS authors (Ciborra, 2002; Hanseth &
Braa, 2000; Star & Ruhleder, 1996; Bowker & Star, 2000). Whilst Ciborra theorises infrastructure
from a phenomenological perspective, Star comes from a tradition of grounded theory. The emphasis
of both authors is that the relations that information infrastructures enact are dense and diffuse and that
knowledge of any infrastructure as a ‘totality’ is virtually impossible. In this sense, infrastructure is
always something that is locally achieved through the textured ‘knitting together’ of practices. Both
Ciborra (2002) and Star & Ruhleder (1996) use the term ‘ecology’ with reference to infrastructure to
depict the inherent heterogeneity and complex interconnectedness of information infrastructures,
which tend to fade into the background except at times of ‘breakdown’.
Bowker & Star (2000) suggest several techniques for overcoming this tendency and eliciting the
richness of infrastructural ecology. They suggest a focus on the classifications, standards and
categories upon which the interconnectivity of infrastructure depends, as well as on the spaces
between categories and classifications (the unclassifiable, that which is outside categorisation) as a
basis for understanding how interconnectivity is locally achieved and what the historical conditions for
that interconnectivity are. They argue that standards, categories and classifications play a significant
role in affording interconnectivity, but that there is a tendency to overlook them because they are
frequently embedded in apparently mundane objects such as lists, programming code or document
layouts and, as such, are seldom understood as a basis for compelling narrative or insightful research.
However, Bowker & Star argue that “standards are material as well as symbolic” (2000:39) and hence
that, “systems of classification (and of standardization) form a juncture of social organisation, moral
order, and layers of technical integration.” (2000:33).
Similarly, Ciborra also sees infrastructures as both material and symbolic.
‘formative context’ to describe infrastructure

He uses the term

not just as sets of hardware and software but as sets of the pre-existing institutional
arrangements, cognitive frames, and imageries that actors bring to and routinely enact in,
a situation of action. (Ciborra, 2002:70)
In this sense Ciborra sees local engagement with infrastructure as an occasion that “triggers
reflexivity” and can lead to innovation. He cites the open source movement and the development of
the Linux operating system as manifestations of this kind of innovation.
Actor-network theory has proven to be helpful to the study of infrastructure (Monteiro, 2000:
Monteiro & Hanseth, 1996). Authors who use ANT to describe infrastructure and the adoption of
standards use the technique of ‘following the actor’ where the emergence, design and adoption of a
technology or standard is traced through detailed empirical research (Hanseth & Braa, 2000). The
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complex character of associations formed appears as surprising and unpredictable when they are
described ‘as they happen’ and not purely from the standpoint of intention or post hoc analysis.
As regards constructing a theoretical basis for collecting data on DBE governance this is an important
point. It is possible that the debate over what governance framework to adopt will be comprised of a
number of different groups offering a number of differing perspectives. ANT-influenced studies focus
on how human, symbolic and material resources become enrolled within a network. They also focus
on how the interests of human and non-human stakeholders, or actors, become translated and inscribed
as networks are formed. In the planning of research, it is thought that the concept of the actor and
processes of enrolment, translation and inscription will all be relevant to the study of DBE
governance. Underpinning debates surrounding governance will be arguments concerning individual
technological components and the circumstances and rationale surrounding their integration. Being
able to treat the DBE as a socio-technical network where social and technological arguments can be
both discrete and convergent will form an important part of the process of data collection.
3.2

Methodology for data collection and analysis

Empirical data will be collected as part of an ongoing process of discussion and consultation among
DBE partners, early SME adopters and other interested parties including the European Commission
and other projects within the Digital Ecosystem cluster of projects. Participant observer research will
be carried out at relevant project meetings and data gathered from e-mail communications. There are
also a number of public discussion forums concerning DBE governance and related topics such as
sustainability which will act as valuable sources of data. In addition, a selection of interviews will be
carried out with early SME adopters. The exact number and cross-section of interviews will depend
upon which of the SME adopters remain involved in the project. On the basis of early interviews with
SMEs, it is clear that governance constitutes an area that it is difficult for participants to think about as
an abstract concern. Therefore interviews will be scheduled to coincide with early implementation
activities where SMEs attempt to attach one of their existing software services to the infrastructure as
a ‘legacy’ application. Carrying out interviews whilst interviewees are still working through the
implementation process should help to draw out details and requirements relevant to discussions
regarding DBE governance.
The data collected will be mainly comprised of e-mail and discussion forum excerpts, interview
transcripts and research notes taken from meetings. These data will be submitted to a process of
analysis according to Grounded Theory principles (Glaser & Strauss, 1966). Grounded theory and
actor-network theory are complimentary to one another since they are both theories that advocate an
empirically grounded approach to looking at research data. However, a grounded theory approach
demands that data are not submitted to a theoretical framework prior to analysis. Therefore, this study
makes a ‘light’ use of ANT literature and concepts which are used as sensitising devices rather than
theoretical constraints or criteria. Taking a ‘ground-up’ view of governance is significant because it
underpins a process of SME consultation through which SME views and concerns are systematically
fed back to the project. The concepts generated from the process of data collection and analysis will
be used as resources capable of informing the process of developing a framework for governance. The
implications drawn will form a useful starting point for considering what model of governance will be
best suited to the task of ensuring that the DBE makes a successful transition from European project to
sustainable community.
Early research findings have suggested that there are three areas of governance that will require
consideration: the constitution of a governing body; the maintenance and governance of the
infrastructure itself and governance to support the participation of SMEs. Potential implications
relating to these three areas are described below.
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4

POTENTIAL CONCERNS AND IMPLICATIONS

4.1

Establishing a Governing Body

Whether the project elects to create a foundation (such as the Apache foundation), a ‘democratic
model’ based on voting rights, or a benign dictatorship (such as the Linux kernel), leadership will be
an extremely important aspect of the ecosystem’s development. At the level of code development, the
DBE currently consists of around 40 individual components which have been developed among a
fixed group of developers from various project partners. Individual technical components are of
sufficient technical interest that they could be established as individual projects, however, the danger
of forking or dissipation presents itself.
A governing body has the potential to disseminate and
market the underlying principles of the DBE architecture and demonstrate how individual projects are
designed as interconnected units. The technical cohesion of the project as a whole depends upon this
issue and as such it is an important concern for any governing body.

4.2

Governing the DBE infrastructure

The distributed nature of the DBE infrastructure means that ‘hosting’ and providing secure
repositories for sensitive data and information are key concerns of SMEs. Hosting raises issues of
trust, security and consumer protection. These are issues that SMEs have raised as potential barriers to
their being able to integrate their existing applications and services with the DBE infrastructure and
are therefore issues that need to be addressed by a governing body.
Whilst it would be counterintuitive to the distributed design of the DBE to provide centralised security or hosting services, a
governing body may be able to gain access to security accreditation and certification standards that
individual SMEs might find difficult to access.
4.3

Governance to support SME participation

As a new open source project, the DBE is faced with the problem that the benefits to small software
houses are still in the process of being fully realised. Whilst the project has been successful at
securing the interest and enthusiasm of smaller companies in the first stage, there are a number of
crucial issues to be addressed that will determine whether that enthusiasm is maintained. Many of
these issues focus around the question of trust. Contributors to the DBE project are searching for
reassurance that, firstly, the DBE community will continue beyond the end of the project and that
secondly, the project will remain open and their contributions will not be lost. If the project is ‘taken
over’ by a single company or organisation, then it is clear that SMEs will feel that their contribution
will be ‘carried off’ to serve that company’s ends. Constituting a governing body founded on
democratic principles with appropriate voting mechanisms and legal powers should guard against this
eventuality.
Interest in the overall architecture of the DBE was one of the primary reasons why participating SMEs
elected to become involved in the project and why they have remained involved up to this point. A
significant number of SMEs (just over half) currently participating in the project were drawn to the
DBE as a project / technology that sought to address social inequalities. From a business point of
view, this was argued in terms of SMEs feeling ‘squeezed out of the market’ by larger technology
companies through the monopolisation of standards. In discussions, the concepts of collaboration and
community were routinely contrasted with concepts of competition and pure business. In some cases,
the ‘levelling’ aspects of the DBE were interpreted in explicitly social terms and associated with
values about social equality as an intrinsically good end to strive for.

7

5

CONCLUSIONS

In designing a framework for governance, the DBE faces a number of challenges, not least of which is
the intrinsic paradox of trying to establish governance of a socio-technical infrastructure that has been
designed as inherently distributed and self-organising (Gallivan, 2001). Strong leadership could be a
solution to this issue but early consultation with SMEs has shown that the unique character of the DBE
architecture offers another solution. Perception of the DBE as a public infrastructure is growing and
the idea of building a platform that is not owned by any one body or organisation has strong appeal.
The question of whether the DBE will be able to stay true to these aims beyond the funded phase of
the project remains to be seen. What is clear is that decisions taken regarding what kind of
governance framework should be aimed for will have consequences for the sustainability of the DBE
as both technology and nascent community.

References
Bergquist, M. and Ljungberg, J. 2001, The Power of Gifts: Organizing Social Relationships in Open
Source Communities. Information Systems Journal (11:4) pp 305-320.
Bowker, G. and Star, L. (2000) Sorting Things Out: classification and its consequences, The MIT
Press: Cambridge, Mass.
Callon, M. (1986) ‘Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the
fishermen of St Brieuc Bay’ in Law, J. (ed.) Power, action and belief: A new sociology of
knowledge? Routledge & Kegan Paul: London.
Ciborra, C. (2002) Labyrinths of Information Systems: challenging the wisdom of systems. Oxford
University Press, Oxford
Darking, M. (2005) Studying SME Engagement in the Digital Business Ecosystem. Report for the
European Comission.
Dini, P. (2005) ‘The Digital Ecosystems Research Visions 2010 and Beyond:’ Report for the
European Commission
http://www.digital-ecosystems.org/events/2005.05/de_position_paper_vf.pdf
Fleming, L. and Waguespack, D.M. (2005) ‘Penguins Camels and other Birds of a Feather:
Brokerage, Boundary Spanning and Leadership in Open Innovation Communities’
http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/flemingwaguespack.pdf Last accessed 12.08.05
Franck, E. and Jungworth, C. (2002) Reconciling investors and donators – the governance structure of
open source, Working paper series, No.8, University of Zurich
http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/jungwirth.pdf Last accessed 8.08.05
Gallivan, M.J. 2001. Striking a Balance between Trust and Control in a Virtual Organization: A
Content Analysis of Open Source Software Case Studies. Information Systems Journal (11:4) pp
277-304.
Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies of Qualitative
Research, London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson.
Grand, S. Von Krogh, G. Leonard, D. Swap, W. (2004) Resource Allocation Beyond Firm
Boundaries: A Multi-Level Model for Open Source Innovation. Long Range Planning, 37, 591610.
Hanseth, O. & Braa, K. (2000) ‘Who’s in Control: Designers, Mangers - or Technology?
Infrastructures at Norsk Hydro’ in Ciborra, C. (ed.) From Control to Drift: the Dynamics of
Corporate Information Infrastructures, Oxford University Press: Oxford
Koch, S. and Schneider, G. 2002. Effort, Cooperation and Coordination in an Open Source Software
Project: GNOME. Information Systems Journal (12:1) pp 27-42.
Lakhani, K.R. and von Hippel, E. (2003) How open source software works: free user to user
assistance. Research policy, 32, 923 – 943
Latour, B. (1987) Science in Action, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA

8

Monteiro, E. (2000) ‘Actor-Network Theory and Information Infrastructure’ in Ciborra, C. From
Control to Drift: the dynamics of corporate information infrastructures. Oxford University Press:
Oxford
Nachira, F. (2002) Towards a Network of Digital Business Ecosystems , European Research
Framework 7 Discussion Paper,
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ebusiness/godigital/sme_research/doc/dbe_discussio
npaper.pdf
Raymond, E.S. (1999) The Cathedral and the Bazaar. O’Reilly, Sebastopol, CA
Raymond, E.S.. (2001). The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an
Accidental Revolutionary. Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly and Associates
Star, L. & Ruhleder, K. (1996) ‘Steps Toward and Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for
Large Information Spaces’ Information Systems Research, vol. 7, no.1, pp.111-133.
Weber, S. (2004) The success of open source. Harvard University Press, London, England.

9

